Effects of pay for performance on the quality of primary care in England. by Campbell, S.M. et al.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/80807
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
special article
Th e  n e w  e ngl a nd  j o u r na l  o f  m e dic i n e
n engl j med 361;4 nejm.org july 23, 2009368
Effects of Pay for Performance  
on the Quality of Primary Care in England
Stephen M. Campbell, Ph.D., David Reeves, Ph.D., Evangelos Kontopantelis, Ph.D., 
Bonnie Sibbald, Ph.D., and Martin Roland, D.M.
From the National Primary Care Research 
and Development Centre, University of 
Manchester, Manchester (S.M.C., D.R., 
E.K., B.S., M.R.); and the University of 
Cambridge General Practice and Primary 
Care Research Unit, Institute of Public 
Health, Cambridge (M.R.) — both in the 
United Kingdom. Address reprint requests 
to Dr. Campbell at the National Primary 
Care Research and Development Centre, 
University of Manchester, Oxford Rd., 
Manchester M13 9PL, United Kingdom, or 
at stephen.campbell@manchester.ac.uk.
N Engl J Med 2009;361:368-78.
Copyright © 2009 Massachusetts Medical Society.
A bs tr ac t
Background
A pay-for-performance scheme based on meeting targets for the quality of clinical 
care was introduced to family practice in England in 2004.
Methods
We conducted an interrupted time-series analysis of the quality of care in 42 repre-
sentative family practices, with data collected at two time points before implemen-
tation of the scheme (1998 and 2003) and at two time points after implementation 
(2005 and 2007). At each time point, data on the care of patients with asthma, diabetes, 
or coronary heart disease were extracted from medical records; data on patients’ 
perceptions of access to care, continuity of care, and interpersonal aspects of care 
were collected from questionnaires. The analysis included aspects of care that were 
and those that were not associated with incentives.
Results
Between 2003 and 2005, the rate of improvement in the quality of care increased for 
asthma and diabetes (P<0.001) but not for heart disease. By 2007, the rate of im-
provement had slowed for all three conditions (P<0.001), and the quality of those 
aspects of care that were not associated with an incentive had declined for patients 
with asthma or heart disease. As compared with the period before the pay-for-
performance scheme was introduced, the improvement rate after 2005 was unchanged 
for asthma or diabetes and was reduced for heart disease (P = 0.02). No significant 
changes were seen in patients’ reports on access to care or on interpersonal aspects 
of care. The level of the continuity of care, which had been constant, showed a re-
duction immediately after the introduction of the pay-for-performance scheme 
(P<0.001) and then continued at that reduced level.
Conclusions
Against a background of increases in the quality of care before the pay-for-perfor-
mance scheme was introduced, the scheme accelerated improvements in quality for 
two of three chronic conditions in the short term. However, once targets were 
reached, the improvement in the quality of care for patients with these conditions 
slowed, and the quality of care declined for two conditions that had not been linked 
to incentives. Continuity of care was reduced after the introduction of the scheme.
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In 2004, the U.K. government intro-duced a pay-for-performance scheme with 136 indicators for family practices. The indicators 
covered the management of chronic disease, prac-
tice organization, and patients’ experiences with 
respect to care.1 In 2006, revisions to the scheme 
added seven new clinical areas, including demen-
tia and chronic kidney disease, and two new indi-
cators of patient access to care (see the Supplemen-
tary Appendix, available with the full text of this 
article at NEJM.org).2 Payments make up approx-
imately 25% of family practitioners’ income, and 
99.6% of family practitioners participated in the 
pay-for-performance scheme, which is voluntary.
We have previously reported on the quality of 
clinical care in 2005, the year after the pay-for-
performance scheme was introduced.3 We found 
a modest acceleration in the rate of improvement 
in the quality of care for asthma and diabetes 
but not for heart disease. There had been rapid 
improvement in the quality of care for all three 
conditions before the introduction of pay for per-
formance. This article extends these analyses to 
include performance data in 2007. We used an 
interrupted time-series analysis to examine trends 
in the quality of clinical care from 1998 through 
2007, a period spanning the introduction of pay 
for performance. We also report on trends in 
patient reports on communication with their phy-
sician, on access to care, and on continuity of 
care across the same period.
Me thods
Data Collection
Trained research staff abstracted clinical data 
from the medical records kept by 42 nationally 
representative family practices. In each practice, 
data were collected for nonoverlapping random 
samples of patients (20 in 1998 and 12 each in 
2003, 2005, and 2007) who had heart disease, 
asthma, or diabetes; the data were collected with 
the use of quality indicators.4,5 The methods 
used to collect data in 2007 were consistent with 
the methods used in 1998, 2003, and 2005.3
For patient evaluation, a version of the General 
Practice Assessment Questionnaire (www.gpaq.
info) was mailed, with one follow-up reminder, 
to a random sample of 200 registered adult pa-
tients (age, ≥18 years) in each practice.6,7 Rapid 
access to any doctor within 48 hours was associ-
ated with an incentive under the pay-for-perfor-
mance scheme, and our questionnaire included 
two items addressing the patient’s ability to get 
an appointment within 48 hours with “any doc-
tor” and with “a particular doctor.” Because of 
concern that the scheme’s focus on clinical indi-
cators might lead practitioners to neglect other 
aspects of care,8 we also analyzed communication 
with physicians and continuity of care. Commu-
nication was assessed by asking seven questions, 
with the answers scored on a six-point scale 
ranging from “very poor” to “excellent”; continu-
ity of care was assessed with the use of the same 
six-point scale and a single question: “How often 
do you see your usual doctor?” All scores were 
rescaled to range from 0 to 100. The rate of re-
sponse to the survey was 38% in 1998, 47% in 
2003, 45% in 2005, and 38% in 2007. In all cases, 
higher scores indicate higher quality of care. The 
research protocol was approved by the North 
West Research Ethics Committee.
Statistical Analysis
As we had done previously,3,9,10 we computed 
an overall clinical quality score for each patient 
in 1998, 2003, 2005, and 2007, which was based 
on the number of indicators for which appropri-
ate care was provided, divided by the number of 
indicators relevant to that patient. This score rep-
resents the percentage, from 0 to 100%, of “nec-
essary” or “indicated” care provided to the patient. 
Practice-level quality scores were computed as the 
mean of individual patient scores in each prac-
tice. We computed separate quality scores for the 
subgroups of indicators that were assigned incen-
tives under the pay-for-performance scheme and 
for the subgroups that were not assigned incen-
tives.
Data on quality of care had been collected in 
the same practices in 1998.9 When a pay-for-
performance scheme was announced for com-
mencement in 2004, we designed an interrupted 
time-series study whereby data on quality of care 
would be collected at two points before the 
scheme was introduced (1998 and 2003) and at 
two points after its introduction (2005 and 2007). 
We use the term “pre-introduction period” to re-
fer to the period from 1998 through 2003, “in-
troduction period” for 2003 through 2005 (from 
the year before to the year after the implementa-
tion of pay for performance), and “post-introduc-
tion period” for 2005 through 2007.
We analyzed the data as an interrupted, or 
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segmented, time series. In this model, the within-
practice variation was partitioned into three main 
components to provide independent tests of the 
slope in scores for the pre-introduction period 
(test 1); the change in level during the introduc-
tion period, allowing for the trend before pay for 
performance (test 2); and the change in slope 
from before to after pay for performance (test 3).11 
Practice was treated as a random effect, and ro-
bust standard-error estimates were used (see the 
Supplementary Appendix).
The analysis for each outcome measure was 
conducted in two steps. In step 1, we used the 
interrupted time-series analysis to look for evi-
dence that pay for performance was having an 
effect on the trend in scores over time, as indi-
cated by a statistically significant result with 
respect to either the change in level or the 
change in slope (tests 2 and 3). The results of 
these tests determined step 2: if the results of 
neither test were significant, there was no evi-
dence that pay for performance had affected the 
preexisting trend and we conducted no further 
analyses; if the results of either test were signifi-
cant, there was evidence of an effect and we in-
vestigated this further by using the coefficients 
from the time-series analysis to compare the 
immediate- and long-term effects of the scheme 
(i.e., compare the slope during the introduction 
period with the slope during the post-introduc-
tion period) and to estimate the size of the effect 
on mean quality scores in 2005 and 2007.
We compared the trends in quality scores for 
the subgroups of indicators associated with in-
centives and indicators not associated with incen-
tives by means of interactions between indicator 
set and the changes in level and slope (as defined 
above) within a regression analysis. If either inter-
action was significant, we took this as evidence 
that the trends varied by indicator set and next 
tested the interaction between indicator set and 
the change in slope from the introduction period 
to the post-introduction period.
The quality scores based on medical records 
and those based on patient evaluation are subject 
to ceilings of 100%, and many practices achieved 
this level on at least one indicator. The ceiling 
necessarily limits any linear trend in improve-
ment, since a score on quality cannot exceed 
100%. Analyses were therefore conducted on 
scores transformed to a logit scale, which has no 
ceiling, as described previously.3 The transforma-
tion increases the weight given to score changes 
near the ceiling or f loor — for example, score 
changes from 97 to 98% and from 55 to 65% are 
numerically equivalent (0.41) after transformation. 
However, where possible, results are re-expressed 
in original units to facilitate interpretation.
To assess the sensitivity of the findings to our 
statistical assumptions, we varied the method of 
statistical inference with the use of a bootstrap 
method, using 1000 bootstrap samples, and we 
assumed a linear model for the trend by repeating 
the analysis on untransformed scores (for details 
see the Supplementary Appendix). We report any 
results that differ from those of the primary 
analysis.
R esult s
Coronary Heart Disease
The quality of care for coronary heart disease had 
been improving before the pay-for-performance 
incentives were introduced (Tables 1 and 2 and 
Fig. 1). The rate of increase was equivalent to an 
average of 3.5% per annum from 1998 through 
Table 1. Mean Clinical-Quality Scores for 42 Family Practices in 1998, 2003, 
2005, and 2007.*
Variable Mean Clinical-Quality Score
1998 2003 2005 2007
Clinical care
Coronary heart disease† 58.6±1.4 76.2±1.6 85.0±1.0 84.8±1.3
Asthma 60.2±2.5 70.3±2.5 84.3±1.8 85.0±1.4
Diabetes 61.6±1.8 70.4±1.5 81.4±0.8 83.7±0.7
Patients’ perceptions
Communication with physicians 69.4±1.0 70.5±1.4 69.1±1.6 71.3±1.2
Access to care (appointment  
within 48 hr)
To see a particular physician 39.0±4.3 33.3±4.0 34.4±3.9 32.1±3.2
To see any physician 67.2±3.3 61.0±3.7 63.9±3.2 64.2±3.2
Continuity of care 70.7±1.7 70.3±1.7 66.2±1.8 66.0±1.6
* Plus–minus values are means ±SE. Data on the care of patients with asthma, 
diabetes, or coronary heart disease were extracted from medical records, and 
data on patients’ perceptions of communication with physicians, access to 
care, and continuity of care were obtained from questionnaires. Communi-
cation was assessed by asking seven questions, with the answers scored on a 
six-point scale ranging from “very poor” to “excellent”; continuity of care was 
assessed with the use of the same six-point scale and a single question: “How 
often do you see your usual doctor?” Access to care was scored as the per-
centage of patients who reported that they were able to get an appointment 
within 48 hours. All scores were rescaled to range from 0 to 100.
† Scores are shown for 40 of the 42 practices.
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2003 (95% confidence interval [CI], 2.8 to 4.2; 
P<0.001). In 2005, after the introduction of pay 
for performance, scores on quality rose slightly, 
but not significantly, higher than expected, as 
compared with the trend before the introduction 
of pay for performance (P = 0.06). Subsequently, 
the rate of improvement dropped below the im-
provement rates for both the pre-introduction 
period (P = 0.02) and the introduction period 
(P = 0.001), and the overall quality score in 2007 
(84.8; 95% CI, 82.2 to 87.4) was similar to that in 
2005 (85.0; 95% CI, 83.0 to 87.1) (Tables 2 and 3 
and Fig. 1).
Asthma
The quality of care for asthma was improving dur-
ing the pre-introduction period, at an average rate 
of 2.0% per annum (95% CI, 0.9 to 3.1; P<0.001), 
and there was a significant change in the level of 
quality over and above this trend in 2005 (P<0.001) 
(Tables 1 and 2 and Fig. 1). However, this acceler-
ated rate of increase was not maintained after 
2005 (P = 0.001). The trend after 2005 did not dif-
fer significantly from the trend before the intro-
duction of pay for performance (P = 0.16), although 
in absolute terms, overall quality hardly changed 
between 2005 (84.3; 95% CI, 80.6 to 88.1) and 
2007 (85.0; 95% CI, 82.2 to 87.8) (Tables 2 and 3 
and Fig. 1).
Diabetes
The quality of care for patients with diabetes was 
improving in the pre-introduction period, at an 
average rate of 1.8% per annum (95% CI, 1.1 to 
2.4; P<0.001) (Tables 2 and 3 and Fig. 1). Diabe-
tes care, like asthma care, showed a significant 
change in the level of improvement after the in-
troduction of pay for performance that was well 
above the preexisting trend (P<0.001). As with 
asthma care, this accelerated rate of improve-
ment was not maintained after 2005 (P<0.001); 
instead, the rate fell back to the pre-introduction 
level (P = 0.91) (Tables 2 and 3 and Fig. 1).
Effect of Incentives on Quality Scores
Mean quality scores for aspects of care that were 
linked to incentives were higher than those for 
care that was not linked to incentives, and this 
pattern applied to all conditions at all four time 
points (Fig. 2). Allowing for these overall differ-
ences, there were further differences over time in 
the scores for aspects of care that were linked to T
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incentives as compared with those that were not. 
For heart disease, the scores for aspects of care 
that were linked to incentives showed a bigger 
immediate increase when the pay-for-performance 
system was introduced (P = 0.05), although this 
trend was not significant as calculated in the lin-
ear model (P = 0.46). The long-term trends (scores 
in the post-introduction period vs. scores in the 
pre-introduction period) did not differ significant-
ly (P = 0.06). However, the difference was signifi-
cant when calculated with the use of the boot-
strapping method (P = 0.05) or the linear model 
(P = 0.03), and in absolute terms, the mean qual-
ity score for aspects of care for heart disease that 
were not linked to incentives declined after 2005, 
whereas the quality score for care that was linked 
to incentives increased. For asthma, the immedi-
ate effect of pay for performance did not differ 
between care that was and care that was not 
linked with incentives (P = 1.00), but the trends 
subsequently diverged (post-introduction period 
vs. pre-introduction period, P = 0.006; post-intro-
duction period vs. introduction period, P = 0.05), 
with the mean score for care that was not linked 
to incentives declining after 2005, and the mean 
score for care that was linked to incentives in-
creasing. Trends in diabetes care did not differ 
at any time according to whether the care was 
linked to incentives.
Communication, Waiting Times,  
and Continuity of Care
The percentages of patients able to see a physician 
within 48 hours, as well as the mean scores on 
the physician-communication scale, showed no 
significant changes in trend. Continuity of care 
declined significantly after the introduction of 
pay for performance (P<0.001) and remained at 
this lower level (Tables 1 and 2 and Fig. 2).
Estimated Overall Effect of Pay  
for Performance
For outcomes in which there was evidence that 
pay for performance altered the trend in quality 
improvement, we used coefficients from the inter-
rupted time-series analysis to compute estimates 
of the increase in scores beyond that expected 
from the trend in the pre-introduction period 
(back-transforming the results from the logit 
analysis, with estimated 95% confidence limits). 
As compared with the expected level of improve-
ment based on the pre-introduction trend, the pay-
for-performance scheme was associated with an 
improvement in the quality of care for diabetes of 
7.5 percentage points in 2005 (95% CI, 4.7 to 10.4) 
and 6.9 percentage points in 2007 (95% CI, 3.8 to 
10.0). For asthma, the increase in quality poten-
tially attributable to pay for performance was 9.4 
percentage points in 2005 (95% CI, 3.9 to 15.0) 
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Figure 1. Mean Scores for the Quality of Care at the Practice Level, 1998–2007.
Panel A shows scores for the quality of care provided for coronary heart 
disease, asthma, and diabetes. Quality scores range from 0% (no quality 
indicator was met for any patient) to 100% (all quality indicators were met 
for all patients). Panel B shows scores for patients’ perceptions of commu-
nication with physicians, access to care, and continuity of care. Communi-
cation was assessed by asking seven questions, with the answers scored on 
a six-point scale ranging from “very poor” to “excellent”; continuity of care 
was assessed with the use of the same six-point scale and a single question: 
“How often do you see your usual doctor?” Access to care was scored as 
the percentage of patients who reported that they were able to get an ap-
pointment within 48 hours. All scores were rescaled to range from 0 to 100.
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and 5.5 percentage points in 2007 (95% CI, −1.0 
to 12.1). For heart disease, pay for performance 
in 2005 was associated with a nonsignificant im-
provement in quality above the levels expected 
(2.8 percentage points; 95% CI, −0.1 to 5.8), and 
in 2007, it was associated with a nonsignificant 
reduction in quality from that expected (0.8 per-
centage points; 95% CI, −4.7 to 3.1). The results 
of patient evaluations of continuity of care were 
4.1 percentage points lower than expected in 2005 
(95% CI, −6.1 to −2.0) and 4.3 percentage points 
lower in 2007 (95% CI, −6.9 to −1.6).
Discussion
We previously found that there were improve-
ments in some aspects of clinical care over and 
above the underlying trend after the introduction 
of a pay-for-performance scheme.3 Our current 
findings suggest that although these initial im-
provements were maintained, for two of the three 
conditions studied (heart disease and asthma), 
improvements in the quality of care reached a 
plateau a year after the scheme’s introduction. 
Allowing for ceiling effects, care for diabetes con-
tinued to improve, but it did so at a rate equiva-
lent to that of the rate in the pre-introduction 
period.
Within these overall trends for care, we found 
significant differences between aspects of care 
that were linked to incentives and aspects of care 
that were not linked to incentives. For asthma 
and heart disease, we found a significant differ-
ence in the effect of pay for performance on 
these two groups of quality indicators; for both 
conditions, mean quality scores for aspects of 
care that were not linked to incentives dropped 
between 2005 and 2007, whereas mean scores 
for aspects of care that were linked to incentives 
continued to increase. This widening gap in qual-
ity came on top of already lower levels of care for 
indicators not linked to incentives.
For all aspects of care — whether associated 
with incentives or not — and for all three condi-
tions, rates of quality improvement slowed con-
siderably after 2005. There are several possible ex-
planations. The first is that near-maximal scores 
had been achieved. However, whereas achieve-
ment was high for some indicators (e.g., smoking 
status recorded for more than 98% of patients 
for all conditions), the logit transformation the-
oretically eliminates ceiling effects, and we ob-
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served the same plateau effect for indicators re-
flecting lower levels of achievement. A second 
explanation is that once initial gains had been 
made, subsequent gains were more difficult to 
achieve. A third explanation is that the structure 
of the pay-for-performance scheme did not reward 
further improvement once targets had been at-
tained. This explanation is supported by the fact 
that family practices in our study gained, on 
average, 96.9% of available clinical-quality pay-
ment points in 2005 and 97.8% in 2007 (which 
were similar to the average gains of 97.1% and 
97.5%, respectively, for all family practices in 
England12,13) — that is, there was little financial 
incentive for further improvement. A fourth ex-
planation is that family practitioners had suffi-
cient income and had little personal motivation 
to improve performance and income further (the 
target-income hypothesis); this explanation would 
be consistent with the 30 to 40% gains in fam-
ily practitioners’ net income from the 2002–2003 
period to the 2005–2006 period.14
Our data cannot be used to ascertain the rela-
tive merit of these explanations. However, gov-
ernment negotiators in England appear to en-
dorse the third explanation (too many physicians 
achieving maximal or near-maximal payments 
for quality of care). Alterations of the pay-for-
performance scheme in 2006 introduced higher 
thresholds for maximal clinical-quality payments 
and a wider range of indicators (see the Supple-
mentary Appendix).
This study suggests that continuity of care 
declined after pay for performance was intro-
duced. One possible explanation is that practices 
focused on meeting rapid-access targets in which 
access to any doctor in the practice within 48 
hours was linked to incentives but access to a 
particular physician was not,15 making it more 
difficult for patients to see their own doctor. This 
could be an unintended and perverse effect of 
the scheme and is a concern, since continuity is 
an aspect of family practice that patients value.16 
Another explanation is that there were increases 
in the size of practices, and many practices in-
troduced nurse-led clinics for management of 
individual chronic diseases. Although this may 
have been an important part of improving the 
quality of care, it may have made continuity of 
care harder to achieve.
Other studies suggest that financial incentives 
result in small improvements in quality.17,18 Our 
data suggest that the pay-for-performance scheme 
in England attained its quality-improvement goals 
but that the pace of improvement was not sus-
tained once these goals had been reached. There 
may be unintended consequences for aspects of 
care other than those studied, which may be in-
fluenced by differences in the operational details 
of apparently similar incentive schemes.19 An 
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unanticipated benefit of the scheme in England 
has been a reduction in sociodemographic in-
equalities in the delivery of health care.20
Our study has several limitations. First, the pay-
for-performance scheme was introduced through-
out the United Kingdom, thereby precluding a 
controlled trial and making the use of an inter-
rupted time series the best evaluation method 
available. The only other time-series analysis of 
the quality of primary care in England suggests 
that pay for performance has had a more modest 
effect than that suggested by our results.21 Sec-
ond, because practices were observed at only two 
time points before the introduction of pay for 
performance, we cannot say whether the rate of 
improvement was already accelerating as a result 
of earlier but still ongoing initiatives. Third, the 
statistical power of our study was such that only 
moderate-to-large differences in trend were de-
tectable between indicators that were and those 
that were not associated with incentives. Fourth, 
response rates for the patient questionnaire were 
poor (38 to 47%), although there is no reason to 
suspect any differences in bias at the four study 
time points. Finally, we focused on three diseases 
for which substantial efforts had been made to 
improve the quality of care before the introduc-
tion of the pay-for-performance scheme. Pay for 
performance might have a greater effect on con-
ditions with lower profiles, including some in-
troduced as the scheme developed (e.g., learning 
disabilities).
In conclusion, between 1998 and 2007, there 
were significant improvements in measurable as-
pects of clinical performance with respect to the 
care provided for three major chronic diseases. 
The initial acceleration in the underlying rate of 
quality improvement after the introduction of pay 
for performance was not sustained. If the aim of 
pay for performance is to give providers incen-
tives to attain targets, the scheme achieved that 
aim. There may have been unintended conse-
quences, including reductions in the quality of 
some aspects of care not linked to incentives and 
in the continuity of care.
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